|
|
|
|
|
| Ibele, Erik W.. |
| There are two basic types of legal regime for the protection of geographical indications (GIs). Some systems, notably that of the European Union, define and treat GIs as a distinct type of intellectual property. This approach is also reflected in the provisions concerning GIs in the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement). Other legal systems, notably those of Australia, Canada and the United States, treat GIs as a subcategory of trademarks. Like trademarks, GIs function principally as a means of providing information to consumers. EU legislation and jurisprudence, however, define GIs more expansively than do trademark-based legal systems, and see GIs as in some ways superior to trademarks. The EU is attempting... |
| Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Geographical indications; Intellectual property; Origin Regulation; Trademarks; TRIPS; WTO; Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety; International Relations/Trade. |
| Ano: 2009 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/48791 |
| |
|
| |
|
| |
|
|
| Kerr, William A.. |
| The GATT was an organization that was seldom at the centre of political controversy, nor was it the object of virulent protest. The WTO, which succeeded it, however, has not enjoyed the GATT's anonymity. The controversies surrounding the WTO detract from its effectiveness and debase its credibility. In large measure, the contentious issues that the WTO has been attempting to deal with since its inception do not have at their heart trade in goods and services. The framers of the WTO took bold steps to create a new institution during the Uruguay Round--much of which has turned out to be a significant improvement on the GATT. This does not mean, however, that everything that was put in place has proved to be an improvement, or even workable. It may be time to... |
| Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Civil society; Trade sanctions; TRIPS; WTO; International Relations/Trade. |
| Ano: 2000 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/23842 |
| |
|
|
| Kerr, William A.. |
| There is a major split between developed and developing countries over the protection of the patents in pharmaceuticals in the TRIPS. This dispute is symptomatic of the difficulties of incorporating a non-trade issue into a trade organization. Incentives and threats are examined in the context of the TRIPS. It is concluded that developing countries have no direct incentives to protect intellectual property, that the threat of trade actions is unlikely to induce compliance and that the use of indirect incentives is discredited and will fail to achieve its objective over the long run. Successful protection of intellectual property in developing countries will require a way to provide them with a direct incentive to enforce such protection. |
| Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Enforcement; Incentives; Intellectual property; Knowledge economy; Threats; TRIPS; International Relations/Trade. |
| Ano: 2003 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/23815 |
| |
|
| |
|
| |
|
| |
|
| |
|
|
|
