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| Wilson, William W.; Wilson, Wesley W.. |
| Auctions are common mechanisms for identifying prices and suppliers of commodities and are particularly important in agricultural marketing. Information asymmetries among bidders may be ameliorated over time through some form of learning. In this study, we incorporate prior decisions to participate, information from previous auctions, and firm-specific attributes to explain both the decision to bid and the level of the bid. Our analysis uses data from Egyptian oilseed tenders, an important market both for oilseeds and tendering. Because of the unbalanced nature of the panel data, we are able to evaluate the effects of signals received from previous tenders. We find that firms learn from previous auctions and can gain an informational advantage through... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Auction; Bidding; Tenders; Optimal bids; Learning; Marketing. |
| Ano: 2002 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/23647 |
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| Schilizzi, Steven; Latacz-Lohmann, Uwe. |
| Buying environmental services from private landholders using tendering mechanisms are usually subject to a budget constraint. Auction theory has mostly focused on target-constrained auctions and is not well developed for this type of auction. This paper examines the predictive capacity of a simple model developed for budget-constrained tenders, already used to design new conservation programs, by submitting it to controlled lab experiments. We study the capacity of the model to predict both experimental bids and the performance of the auction institution, based on the kind of limited information typically available to a conservation agency. We conclude there exists an optimal level of information on bidders’ costs, neither too large nor to small, making... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Auctions; Procurement; Tenders; Conservation; Learning; Economic experiments. |
| Ano: 2009 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/48171 |
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