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When Should Uncertain Nonpoint Emissions be Penalized in a Trading Program? AgEcon
Hennessy, David A.; Feng, Hongli.
When nonpoint source pollution is stochastic and the damage function is convex, intuition might suggest it is more important to control a nonpoint pollution source than a point source. Earlier research has provided sufficient conditions such that the permit price for a unit of ex-ante expected emissions should be higher than the permit price for a unit of certain emissions. Herein we provide a set of necessary and sufficient conditions such that this is the case. An approach to testing for the validity of the condition set is available, and has been applied to a related problem.
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Agricultural pollution; Multiple inputs; Permit trading; Social optimality; Trading ratio; Water quality; Environmental Economics and Policy; Q1; Q2; D2; D8.
Ano: 2007 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/9805
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Simulation of factors impeding water quality trading market performance AgEcon
Smith, Craig M.; Peterson, Jeffrey M.; Leatherman, John C..
Over the past several decades, market-based approaches to natural resource management have received increased attention as a means to cost-effectively achieve environmental quality goals. Following on what has been hailed a success for reducing air pollution, water quality trading (WQT) has more recently been seen as the next great opportunity for reducing water pollution, especially for nutrient loading. Numerous trading programs have been pilot tested and/or adopted in states throughout the nation, with more than 70 programs now in operation (Breetz et al., 2004). WQT would allow multiple contributors to surface water degradation to determine how best to meet an overarching collective goal related to pollution reduction. WQT takes advantage of...
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Water quality trading; Market based; Trading ratio; Information levels; Point source; Nonpoint source; Simulation; Environmental Economics and Policy; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy.
Ano: 2010 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/61125
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Examining Point-Nonpoint Trading Ratios for Acid Mine Drainage Remediation with a Spatial-Temporal Optimization Model AgEcon
Zhao, Xiaobing; Fletcher, Jerald J..
A trading ratio is required for water quality trading that involves nonpoint sources to compensate for the difficulty of determining nonpoint loadings, the stochastic characteristics of nonpoint loadings, and the uncertainty inherent in nonpoint source pollution control strategies. Compensating for risk and uncertainty is one of the primary justifications that a trading ratio greater than one is commonly considered. However, the appropriate specific value of a trading ratio remains unclear because of qualitative differences between point and nonpoint sources. This study addresses a growing concern with the analytical underpinnings of point/nonpoint trading ratios in water quality trading programs. This paper considers a basic spatial-temporal optimal...
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Point-nonpoint water quality trading; Trading ratio; Acid mine drainage; Spatial-temporal optimization; Environmental Economics and Policy.
Ano: 2005 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/19231
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Optimal Design of Permit Markets with an ex ante Pollution Target AgEcon
Rabotyagov, Sergey S.; Feng, Hongli; Kling, Catherine L..
The optimal pollution permit trading system is examined when the regulator, faced with incomplete information on firms' abatement costs and delivery coefficients, seeks to minimize expected total abatement costs to meet an ex ante pollution target. Intuitively, we find that the optimal trading ratio and permit cap are set such that there will be more pollution when abatement costs are high and less pollution when abatement costs are low. Surprisingly however , even when the delivery coefficients are known with certainty, the optimal trading ratio will not necessarily equal the delivery coefficient, nor will it be optimal for the total permit quantity to equal the given pollution target. Instead, the trading ratio will tend to be larger when there is...
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Delivery coefficient; Ex ante pollution target; Ex post pollution target; Permit trading; Total permit cap; Trading ratio; Environmental Economics and Policy.
Ano: 2006 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/21312
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Optimal Design of Permit Markets with an Ex Ante Pollution Target AgEcon
Rabotyagov, Sergey S.; Feng, Hongli; Kling, Catherine L..
In this paper, we examine the design of permit trading programs when the objective is to minimize the cost of achieving an ex ante pollution target, that is, one that is defined in expectation rather than an ex post deterministic value. We consider two potential sources of uncertainty, the presence of either of which can make our model appropriate: incomplete information on abatement costs and uncertain delivery coefficients. In such a setting, we find three distinct features that depart from the well-established results on permit trading: (1) the regulator's information on firms' abatement costs can matter; (2) the optimal permit cap is not necessarily equal to the ex ante pollution target; and (3) the optimal trading ratio is not necessarily equal to the...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Delivery coefficient; Ex ante pollution target; Ex post pollution target; Permit trading; Total permit cap; Trading ratio; Environmental Economics and Policy.
Ano: 2006 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/18347
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