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	Provedor de dados AgEcon (2) Autor Cornelli, Francesca (1) Gaitan, Beatriz (1) Kominek, Zbigniew (1) Ljungqvist, Alexander (1) Pavel, Ferdinand (1) Palavra-chave Transition Economies (2) Boards of Directors (1) CEO Turnover (1) Corporate Governance (1) D34 (1) E13 (1) F12 (1) Financial Economics (1) G24 (1) G32 (1) G34 (1) Growth and Development (1) Imperfect Competition (1) International Relations/Trade (1) International Trade (1) K22 (1) L16 (1) Large Shareholders (1) Legal Reforms (1) O16 (1) Mais... Tipo do documento Conference Paper or Presentation (1) Working or Discussion Paper (1) Ano 2010 (1) 2000 (1) País United States (2) Idioma Inglês (2)		Ordenar por:  Relevância Autor Título Ano Registros recuperados: 2 Primeira ... 1 ... Última IS 'GETTING THE PRICES RIGHT' ALWAYS RIGHT? HOW TRADE LIBERALIZATION CAN FAIL AgEcon Gaitan, Beatriz; Pavel, Ferdinand. We present a general equilibrium model with oligopsonistic market structure in one of the sectors. Buyers of inputs can set the price of inputs by being involved in rent seeking activities. The framework developed is applied to the Bulgarian economy in particular to the agro-food chain. From the application to the Bulgarian economy we find that if there are market imperfections, such as oligopsonistic behavior in the economy, there are no significant welfare gains from free trade. Significant welfare gains from trade are observed only when a competitive structure prevails. We show that eliminating this market imperfection can bring important welfare implications and an efficient reallocation of resources. Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Imperfect Competition; Oligopsony; International Trade; Growth and Development; Transition Economies; International Relations/Trade; D34; E13; F12; L16. Ano: 2000 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/21881 Monitoring Managers: Does it Matter? AgEcon Cornelli, Francesca; Kominek, Zbigniew; Ljungqvist, Alexander. We test under what circumstances boards discipline managers and whether such interventions improve performance. We exploit exogenous variation due to the staggered adoption of corporate governance laws in formerly Communist countries coupled with detailed ‘hard’ information about the board’s performance expectations and ‘soft’ information about board and CEO actions and the board’s beliefs about CEO competence in 473 mostly private-sector companies backed by private equity funds between 1993 and 2008. We find that CEOs are fired when the company underperforms relative to the board’s expectations, suggesting that boards use performance to update their beliefs. CEOs are especially likely to be fired when evidence has mounted that they are incompetent and... Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Corporate Governance; Large Shareholders; Boards of Directors; CEO Turnover; Legal Reforms; Transition Economies; Private Equity; Financial Economics; G34; G24; G32; K22; O16; P21. Ano: 2010 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/60665 Registros recuperados: 2 Primeira ... 1 ... Última

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