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| Layton, David F.; Siikamaki, Juha. |
| This paper considers the role of incentive payment programs in eliciting, estimating, and predicting landowners' conservation enrollments. Using both program participation and the amount of land enrolled, we develop two econometric approaches for predicting enrollments. The first is a multivariate censored regression model that handles zero enrollments and heterogeneity in the opportunity cost of enrollments by combining an inverse hyperbolic sine transformation of enrollments with alternative-specific correlation and random parameters. The second is a beta-binomial model, which recognizes that in practice elicited enrollments are essentially integer valued. We apply these approaches to Finland, where the protection of private nonindustrial forests is an... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Protection; Endangered; Voluntary; Incentive; Tobit; Beta-binomial; Stated preferences; Environmental Economics and Policy. |
| Ano: 2005 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10775 |
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| Blackman, Allen; Boyd, James. |
| Increasingly popular tailored regulation (TR) initiatives like EPA's Project XL allow plants to voluntarily substitute site-specific environmental performance standards for command-and-control regulations that dictate pollution abatement strategies. TR can significantly reduce participants' costs of complying with environmental regulations. But in doing so, it can also provide participants with a competitive advantage. We show that this can have undesirable welfare consequences when it enables relatively inefficient firms in oligopolistic markets to "steal" market share from more efficient firms. One critical determinant of whether or not TR has such adverse welfare impacts is the regulator's policy regarding the diffusion of TR agreements among... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Tailored regulation; Voluntary; Site-specific; Performance standards; Regulatory reform; Environmental Economics and Policy. |
| Ano: 2000 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10740 |
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