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	Provedor de dados AgEcon (2) Ecology and Society (1) Autor Blackman, Allen (2) Afsah, Shakeb (1) Frynas, Jedrzej G; Middlesex University Business School; g.frynas@mdx.ac.uk (1) Mazurek, Janice V. (1) Ratunanda, Damayanti (1) Palavra-chave Voluntary regulation (3) Environmental Economics and Policy (2) Corporate Social Responsibility (1) Environment (1) Indonesia (1) Informal regulation (1) O13 (1) Oil spill prevention (1) Oil spills (1) Petroleum (1) Project XL (1) Public disclosure (1) Q25 (1) Q28 (1) Regulation (1) Regulatory reform and reinvention (1) Site-specific regulation (1) Tailored regulation (1) Transactions costs (1) Mais... Tipo do documento Working or Discussion Paper (2) Peer-Reviewed article (1) Ano 2012 (1) 2000 (1) 1999 (1) País United States (2) Canada (1) Idioma Inglês (3)		Ordenar por:  Relevância Autor Título Ano Registros recuperados: 3 Primeira ... 1 ... Última Corporate Social Responsibility or Government Regulation? Evidence on Oil Spill Prevention Ecology and Society Frynas, Jedrzej G; Middlesex University Business School; g.frynas@mdx.ac.uk. Tipo: Peer-Reviewed article Palavras-chave: Corporate Social Responsibility; Oil spill prevention; Oil spills; Petroleum; Regulation; Voluntary regulation. Ano: 2012 How Do Public Disclosure Pollution Control Programs Work? Evidence from Indonesia AgEcon Afsah, Shakeb; Blackman, Allen; Ratunanda, Damayanti. Although a growing body of evidence suggests that publicly disclosing information about plants' environmental performance can motivate emissions reductions, this phenomenon remains poorly understood. To help fill this gap, this paper presents original data from a survey of plants participating in the Program for Pollution Control, Evaluation and Rating (PROPER), Indonesia's widely-acclaimed public disclosure program. These data suggest that a key means by which PROPER spurs abatement is improving factory managers' information about their own plants' emissions and abatement opportunities. This finding contrasts with the prevailing view in the literature that public disclosure enhances pressures to abate placed on firms by external agents such as community... Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Public disclosure; Environment; Voluntary regulation; Informal regulation; Indonesia; Environmental Economics and Policy; Q28; Q25; O13. Ano: 2000 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10515 The Cost of Developing Site-Specific Environmental Regulations: Evidence from EPA's Project XL AgEcon Blackman, Allen; Mazurek, Janice V.. The flagship of the Environmental Protection Agency's regulatory reinvention initiative, Project XL has been touted as a "regulatory blueprint" for a site-specific, performance-based pollution control system. But widespread complaints about the costs of the program beg the question of whether the costs of tailoring regulations to individual facilities are manageable. To address this question, this paper presents original survey data on a sample of 11 XL projects. We find that the fixed costs of putting in place XL agreements are substantial, averaging over $450,000 per firm. While stakeholder negotiations are widely cited as the principal source for these costs, we find that they actually arise mainly from interaction between participating facilities and... Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Project XL; Site-specific regulation; Tailored regulation; Voluntary regulation; Transactions costs; Regulatory reform and reinvention; Environmental Economics and Policy. Ano: 1999 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10844 Registros recuperados: 3 Primeira ... 1 ... Última

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