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Registros recuperados: 78
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An Analysis of Pricing in the U.S. Cotton Seed Market AgEcon
Shi, Guanming; Stiegert, Kyle W.; Chavas, Jean-Paul.
The purpose of the research in this paper is to investigate the impact of differentiated vertical strategies by agricultural biotechnology firms in the U.S. cottonseed market. The model advances the measurement of industry concentration to consider substitution/complementarity relationships among differentiated products delivered under different vertical structures. We find evidence of sub-additive pricing in the stacking of bundled biotech traits. Prices paid by farmers for cottonseed sold under vertical integration are found to be higher than under licensing. The model is flexible and allows for evaluation of the effects of changing market structures. The parameters on traditional measures of concentration indicate that higher concentration leads to...
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Modal Vertical Strategy; Imperfect competition; Cotton seed; Biotechnology; Agricultural and Food Policy; Demand and Price Analysis; Industrial Organization; L13; L4; L65.
Ano: 2009 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/51617
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An empirical investigation of the welfare effects of banning wholesale price discrimination AgEcon
Villas-Boas, Sofia Berto.
3rd revision CUDARE Working Paper 1017R3 October 2008, 2nd revision CUDARE Working Paper 1017R2 August 2008, 1st revision CUDARE Working Paper 1017R February 2007, CUDARE Working Paper 1017 August 2006.
Tipo: Working Paper Palavras-chave: Economic theory does not provide sharp predictions on the welfare effects of banning wholesale price discrimination: if downstream costs differences exist then discrimination shifts production inefficiently; Towards high cost retailers; So a ban increases welfare; If differences in price elasticity of demand across retailers exist; Discrimination may increase welfare if more market is covered; So a ban reduces welfare. Using retail prices and quantities of coffee brands sold by German retailers; I estimate a model of demand and supply and separate cost and demand differences. Simulating a ban on wholesale price discrimination has positive welfare effects in this market; And less if downstream cost differences shrink; Or with less competition.; Consumer/Household Economics; L13.
Ano: 2008 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/120491
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Assessing Competition in the U.S. Beef Packing Industry AgEcon
Ward, Clement E..
Tipo: Journal Article Palavras-chave: Beef; Cattle; Competition; Concentration; Market structure; Meatpacking; Pricing; Agribusiness; Livestock Production/Industries; L13; Q13.
Ano: 2010 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/94758
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Assessing Time-Varying Oligopoly and Oligopsony Power in the U.S. Paper Industry AgEcon
Mei, Bin; Sun, Changyou.
The U.S. paper industry has become increasingly concentrated and therefore been suspected of imperfect competition. In this study, the new empirical industrial organization approach is employed to measure the degree of oligopoly and oligopsony power in the U.S. paper industry simultaneously. The model is estimated by iterative three-stage least squares using annual data from 1955 to 2003. The results reveal that there has been significant oligopoly and oligopsony power in the U.S. paper industry, and the oligopoly power has been consistently lower than the oligopsony power.
Tipo: Journal Article Palavras-chave: Market power; NEIO; Three-stage least squares; Time-varying parameters; Agribusiness; Environmental Economics and Policy; Land Economics/Use; Production Economics; L13; Q23.
Ano: 2008 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/47268
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Buyer Alliances as Countervailing Power in WIC Infant-Formula Auctions AgEcon
Davis, David E..
State WIC agencies in infant-formula procurement auctions receive lower bids and final prices when they are in buyer’s alliances than when they are unallied. The Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC) uses an auction to procure infant formula. Manufacturers bid on the right to be an agency’s sole supplier by offering a rebate on formula sold through WIC. A theoretical model of rebates shows that bidders may shade their bids and extract surplus from agencies. An empirical estimation shows that bids are lower to alliances suggesting that alliances countervail the power of bidders to extract surplus.
Tipo: Working Paper Palavras-chave: Auctions; Food assistance; Countervailing power; Buyer concentration; Oligopoly; WIC.; Consumer/Household Economics; Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety; Industrial Organization; L13; D43; D44; Q18; I18.
Ano: 2011 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/123863
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Buyer Market Power and Vertically Differentiated Retailers AgEcon
Wang, Shinn-Shyr; Rojas, Christian; Lavoie, Nathalie.
We consider a model of vertical competition where downstream firms (retailers) purchase an upstream input from a monopolist and are able to differentiate from each other in terms of quality. Our primary focus is to study the effects of introducing a large retailer, such as a Wal-Mart Supercenter, that is able to lower wholesale prices (i.e. buyer market power). We obtain two main results. First, the store with no buyer market power responds to the presence of the large retailer by increasing its quality, a finding that is consistent with recent efforts by traditional retailers to enhance shoppers’ buying experience (i.e. quality). Second, the presence of a large retailer causes consumer welfare to increase. There are, however, two reasons for the increase...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Buyer market power; Vertical differentiation; Wal-Mart; Agribusiness; Agricultural and Food Policy; Agricultural Finance; Community/Rural/Urban Development; Crop Production/Industries; Farm Management; Financial Economics; Food Security and Poverty; Industrial Organization; Marketing; D43; L13; L81; M31; Q13.
Ano: 2010 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/57165
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BUYER POWER THROUGH PRODUCER'S DIFFERENTIATION AgEcon
Chambolle, Claire; Villas-Boas, Sofia Berto.
This paper shows that retailers may choose to offer products differentiated in quality to consumers, not to relax downstream competition, but to improve their buyer power in the negotiation with their supplier. We consider a simple vertical industry where two producers sell products differentiated in quality to two retailers who operate in separated markets. In the game, first retailers choose which product to carry, then each retailer and her chosen producer bargain over the terms of a two-part tariff contract and retailers finally choose the quantities. When upstream production costs are convex, the share of the total profits going to the retailer would be higher if they choose to differentiate. We thus isolate the wish to differentiate as "only" due to...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Buyer Power; Product line; Differentiation; Marketing; L13; L42.
Ano: 2007 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/6866
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Certification of Origin and Brands Competition AgEcon
Chambolle, Claire; Giraud-Heraud, Eric.
We analyse the competition in quality and quantity between a foreign firm and a domestic firm. The domestic firm can belong to a certification of origin, whereas its rival uses a pure brand strategy. We will show how the certification can allow the domestic firm to position itself as a high quality producer and improve the average quality of the products offered on the market. If, however, the certified firm offers the low quality good, the certification can permit it to guarantee a higher profit than that of its competitor and to improve the consumers' surplus by favouring product standardisation.
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Certification of origin; Quality; International competition; Demand and Price Analysis; L13; F12; F14.
Ano: 2002 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/24976
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Civil Liability, Safety and Nuclear Parks: Is Concentrated Management Better? AgEcon
Mondello, Gerard.
Ultra-hazardous risky activities as nuclear industry cannot be considered as “normal industries” i.e. industries without abnormal environmental and health risks. Consequently, the industrial organization of these specific sectors is of the utmost importance. This paper aims at studying this question. We focus on the associated costs of prevention and civil liability. We analyze how civil liability rules may contribute to extend or to discourage the expansion of nuclear parks to new operators. The paper compares the consequences of extending the management of nuclear stations to several independent operators. This question can apply to the unification process of the European electricity market in which several public and private nuclear power operators are...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Strict Liability; Electric Energy; Nuclear Plants; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy; Q5; Q58; Q53; K23; L13; L52; L94.
Ano: 2011 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/102571
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Collinearity in Linear Structural Models of Market Power AgEcon
Perloff, Jeffrey M.; Shen, Edward Z..
The well-known structural model used to estimate market structure suffers from a severe collinearity problem if the marginal cost and demand equations are linear.
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Market power; Estimation; Demand and Price Analysis; Industrial Organization; L13; C1.
Ano: 2001 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/25012
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Collusion and seasonality of market price - A case of fixed market shares AgEcon
Bejger, Sylwester.
The paper develops a simple supergame model of collusion that focuses on the role of fixed (exogenous to game played) system of quantity market shares. Conclusions implied by the model could be used to motivate data - saving markers of collusion based on market price behavior. Following conclusions of the theoretical model we propose marker of collusion based on detecting changes in seasonal parameters of prices in periods of possible collusion. An empirical application of method has been done on well known data of Lysine cartel case.
Tipo: Journal Article Palavras-chave: Collusion; Repeated games; Fixed market shares; Seasonality of market price; Financial Economics; L11; L13; L41.
Ano: 2010 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/95962
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Commodity Price Pass-Through in Differentiated Retail Food Markets AgEcon
Richards, Timothy J.; Allender, William J.; Pofahl, Geoffrey M..
Prices for nearly all basic commodity rose at unprecedented rates throughout early 2008, only to fall nearly as fast as financial markets and global economies began to collapse. Rising food prices in 2008 led to concerns that commodity price spikes would lead to more general food inflation, but by early 2009 interest focused more on the seeming inability of food prices to fall back down with commodity prices. This study provides an empirical investigation into the pass-through of commodity prices to retail prices for two different types of food products: potatoes and fluid milk. The results show that pass-through depends on the nature of the food in question, but is generally consistent with theoretical models of pricing by sellers of multiple,...
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Commodity prices; Conduct; Industrial organization; Inflation; Market power; Nested logit; Pass-through; Random parameters model; Consumer/Household Economics; Demand and Price Analysis; Industrial Organization; C35; D12; D43; L13; L41; Q13.
Ano: 2010 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/61187
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Coordinating on Reducing Advertising: Carbonated Soft Drinks Industry and Combating Obesity AgEcon
Berning, Joshua P.; McCullough, Michael.
Replaced with revised version of paper 06/08/11.
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Television advertising; Carbonated soft drink; Oligopoly advertising; Pulse advertising; Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety; Health Economics and Policy; Industrial Organization; Marketing; I18; L13; M37.
Ano: 2011 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/103594
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Deficiency Payments and Market Power: Effects of Imperfect Competition on Welfare Distribution and Decoupling AgEcon
Russo, Carlo.
Despite the increasing importance of market power in the food industry, most policy models assume perfect competition. Ignoring market power may lead economists to make incorrect, or at least misleading, policy recommendations. In this paper I develop a theoretical model in which market power can alter conclusions regarding the welfare effects of a specific policy change: replacing deficiency payments with decoupled payments to farmers, and apply it to the U.S. wheat market and milling industry. The main conclusions of the theoretical model are that, middlemen’s market power may cause i) an increase in public expenditure, ii) an extraction of policy rents from the taxpayers by the middlemen, and iii) a reduction of the social benefit from decoupling...
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Decoupling; Deficiency Payments; Market Power; Financial Economics; Q18; L13.
Ano: 2007 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/9767
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Do International Roaming Alliances Harm Consumers? AgEcon
Buhler, Benno.
We develop a model of international roaming in which mobile network operators (MNOs) compete both on the wholesale market to sell roaming services to foreign operators and on the retail market for subscribers. The operators own a network infrastructure only in their home country. To allow their subscribers to place or receive calls abroad, they have to buy roaming services provided by foreign MNOs. We show that in absence of international alliances and capacity restrictions, competition between foreign operators would drive wholesale unit prices down to marginal costs. However, operators prefer to form international alliances in which members mutually provide roaming services at inefficiently high wholesale prices. Alliances serve as a commitment device to...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: International Roaming; Vertical Relations; Regulation; Industrial Organization; D43; L13; L42; L96.
Ano: 2009 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/55292
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Does Vertical Integration Effect Market Power? Evidence from U.S. Food Manufacturing Industries AgEcon
Bhuyan, Sanjib.
Vertical Integration
Tipo: Journal Article Palavras-chave: Food industries; Market power; Vertical integration; Vertical merger; Crop Production/Industries; Marketing; Production Economics; L13; L22; Q13.
Ano: 2005 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/43737
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Dynamic Assessment of Bertrand Oligopsony in the U.S. Cattle Procurement Market AgEcon
Ji, In Bae; Chung, Chanjin.
The new empirical industrial organization approach with the Bertrand model is employed to measure the oligopsony market power in the U.S. cattle procurement market. The assumption of price competition (Bertrand model) based on the nature of cattle production such as cattle cycle and seasonality is used and compared to quantity competition (Cournot model). The empirical results show that the oligopsony market power exists in the U.S. cattle procurement market. The cattle cycle and seasonality affect the oligopsony market power and the cattle cycle causes the change of market power. However, concentration has a negative effect on the oligopsony market power.
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Cattle cycle; Concentration; Market power; NEIO; Oligopsony; Seasonality; Agribusiness; Demand and Price Analysis; Industrial Organization; Livestock Production/Industries; Marketing; Q13; L13; L16.
Ano: 2011 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/103558
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Empirical evidence on the role of non linear wholesale pricing and vertical restraints on cost pass-through AgEcon
Bonnet, Céline; Dubois, Pierre; Villas-Boas, Sofia Berto.
How a cost shock is passed through into final consumer prices may relate to nominal price stickiness and rigidities, the existence of non adjustable cost components, strategic mark-up adjustments, or other contract terms along the supply distribution chain. This paper presents a simple framework to assess the potential role of non linear pricing contracts and vertical restraints such as resale price maintenance or wholesale price discrimination in the supply chain in explaining the degree of pass-through from upstream cost shocks in the ground coffee category to downstream retail prices. We do so in the German coffee market where both upstream and downstream firms make pricing decisions allowing for non linear pricing and vertical restraints. Using...
Tipo: Working Paper Palavras-chave: Non Linear Pricing; Multiple Manufacturers and Retailers; Ground Coffee; Pass-Through; Resale Price Maintenance; Wholesale Price Discrimination; Consumer/Household Economics; C13; L13; L41.
Ano: 2009 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/120534
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Environmental Labeling and Technology Adoption in the Presence of Strategic Interactions AgEcon
Konishi, Yoshifumi.
This manuscript analyzes the effect of binary ecolabeling on the strategic competition of Cournot duopolists in environmental technology and the output market. Under binary labeling, firms' abatement technologies are not directly observable by consumers but are certified if they satisfy preset ecological standards. Given this asymmetry, I set up the regulator's problem as one of choosing a technology standard, or "cutoff," in emissions per unit of output, below which all abatement efficiency levels are certified. The regulatory authority faces a trade-off in choosing the socially optimal cutoff: The regulator would like to raise the standard to reduce emissions but needs to lower it in order to induce technology adoption. There are three important...
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Ecolabeling; Emissions; Product differentiation; Technology adoption; Environmental Economics and Policy; Industrial Organization; D43; L13; Q53; Q58.
Ano: 2007 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/9949
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ESTIMATING COKE AND PEPSI'S PRICE ADVERTISING STRATEGIES AgEcon
Golan, Amos; Karp, Larry S.; Perloff, Jeffrey M..
AgEcon Search copy replaced with 1999 version 02/02/06.
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Strategies; Noncooperative games; Oligopoly; Generalized maximum entropy; Beverages; Marketing; C13; C35; C72; L13; L66.
Ano: 1997 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/25057
Registros recuperados: 78
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