Sabiia Seb
PortuguêsEspañolEnglish
Embrapa
        Busca avançada

Botão Atualizar


Botão Atualizar

Ordenar por: RelevânciaAutorTítuloAnoImprime registros no formato resumido
Registros recuperados: 6
Primeira ... 1 ... Última
Imagem não selecionada

Imprime registro no formato completo
Between full and non cooperation in the extraction of a natural resource Inra
Querou, N.; Tidball, M.; GERAD, Groupe d'Etudes et de Recherche en Analyse des Décisions (CAN); Czech Society for Operational Research in Cooperation (CZE).
We re-consider the problem of the great fish war developed by Levahri and Mirman when the information is incomplete and agents can form simple beliefs about the other's behavior. Beliefs must be consistent with observed actions. We derive the closed form expressions of the optimal policies, determine the steady state of the dynamics of fish population in our dynamic game, and compare it from an economic and environmental points of view to the non cooperative and cooperative cases. We study the conditions where our results lie in between both cases, and the implications of these findings.
Tipo: Meeting Paper Palavras-chave: THEORIE DES JEUX; GESTION DES RESSOURCES NATURELLES; JEUX DYNAMIQUES; GESTION DE L'ENVIRONNEMENT.
Ano: 2007 URL: http://www.prodinra.inra.fr/prodinra/pinra/doc.xsp?id=PROD2008c6e14904&uri=/notices/prodinra1/2010/12/
Imagem não selecionada

Imprime registro no formato completo
CAP direct payments and distributional conflicts within corporate farms in the New Member States: a game theory approach focusing on rented land Inra
Latruffe, L.; Davidova, S.; AES, Agricultural Economics Society (GBR).
This paper aims to investigate whether distributional issues within corporate farms in the New Member States will be exacerbated by the introduction of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) direct payments. The paper focuses on the specific impact of the direct payments on the rent negotiations between corporate farms and private landowners. If the latter are not satisfied with the level of rent they receive, they have the option to end their rental contract and withdraw their land from the farm. In this paper, game theory is used to model the negotiations between a corporate farm’s manager and a representative landowner. The model suggests that the CAP direct payments might induce more rent renegotiations, and that the latter will be successful and thus...
Tipo: Meeting Paper Palavras-chave: CONFLITS DE DISTRIBUTION; THEORIE DES JEUX; PROPRIETAIRE CAP DIRECT PAYMENTS; CORPORATE FARMS; DISTRIBUTIONAL CONFLICTS; GAME THEORY; LANDOWNER.
Ano: 2005 URL: http://www.prodinra.inra.fr/prodinra/pinra/doc.xsp?id=PROD2009e0c8ecb4&uri=/notices/prodinra1/2010/07/
Imagem não selecionada

Imprime registro no formato completo
From experience to experiments in South African water management Inra
Desole, M.; Farolfi, S.; Patrone, F.; Rio, P.; INRA, Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (FRA).
A role-playing game (RPG), KatAware, was developed in the Kat River catchment of South Africa to support the negotiation process among water users on the allocation rules of the resource. Playing the RPG with local stakeholders exhibited some regularity in the behaviour of players, particularly on their attitude of defining binding agreements. These regularities were first formalized through a model of cooperative game theory (CGT), and then, to confirm the results of the model, tested by an experimental protocol. Both the model and the protocol were based and calibrated on the results of the RPG. The progressive simplification (decontextualization) required to bring the RPG into the laboratory suggested to explore the role of context (in our case water...
Tipo: Book Palavras-chave: THEORIE DES JEUX.
Ano: 2009 URL: http://www.prodinra.inra.fr/prodinra/pinra/doc.xsp?id=PROD201057e2b44d&uri=/notices/prodinra1/2010/02/
Imagem não selecionada

Imprime registro no formato completo
Structure and bargaining power in multilateral negotiations: application to water management policies in France Inra
Simon, L.K.; Thoyer, S.; Morardet, S.; Goodhue, R.; Rio, P.; Rausser, G. C.; INRA, Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (FRA).
Environmental policies are characterized by a growing emphasis on participation, devolution and negotiated decision making. Increasingly, centralized top down decision making systems are being replaced by new forms of local governance. In their strongest versions, these involve delegation of formal authority to local stakeholders who are expected to decide collectively upon the management rules of local common-pool resources. Devolution is particularly important in relation to the allocation and management of scarce water resources. Indeed the French water law of 1992 institutionalised the notion of devolution by requiring that water management rules be negotiated at the river basin level between all stakeholders. Although stakeholder negotiation is...
Tipo: Book Palavras-chave: POLITIQUE DE L'EAU; MARCHANDAGE; THEORIE DES JEUX; MODELE; UTILISATION DE L'EAU.
Ano: 2006 URL: http://www.prodinra.inra.fr/prodinra/pinra/doc.xsp?id=PROD20078142dc66&uri=/notices/prodinra1/2007/05/
Imagem não selecionada

Imprime registro no formato completo
The provision of club goods in the lab Inra
Bchir, M.A.; Willinger, M.; Universidad de Alicante, Department of Economics (FRA); Universitat de Valencia, LINEEX (ESP).
Club goods (also called toll goods) are collective goods with the possibility of excluding individuals who fail to contribute. The possibility of exclusion from the consumption of the public good has conflicting effects on welfare : on one hand it reduces the incentives to free ride, on the other hand it reduces the number of beneficiaries of the public good. Many clubs require a minimum number of members to be able to provide their activity (e.g., a farmer association, etc.). This step-level component can either be considered as a threshold for the provision of the club good itself, or as a threshold for maintaining some activity within an existing club. While previous experimental research focused on fundraising to provide non-existing public goods, we...
Tipo: Meeting Paper Palavras-chave: ECONOMIE EXPERIEMENTALE; THEORIE DES JEUX; SEUIL DE FOURNITURE; EXPERIENCE DE TERRAIN; DILEMME SOCIAL; COTISATION; CONTRIBUTION.
Ano: 2008 URL: http://www.prodinra.inra.fr/prodinra/pinra/doc.xsp?id=PROD20102e1701c4&uri=/notices/prodinra1/2010/10/
Imagem não selecionada

Imprime registro no formato completo
Viability of corporate farms in the New Member States under the Common Agricultural Policy system: a game theory approach focusing on rented land Inra
Latruffe, L.; Davidova, S..
This paper aims to investigate whether distributional issues within corporate farms in the New Member States (NMS) will be exacerbated by the introduction of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) direct payments. The payments are allocated on a per hectare basis under the Single Area Payment Scheme (SAPS), without an obligation to produce at all but providing that the land is kept in good agricultural and environmental conditions. In this context one major challenge faced by the farming sectors in the NMS relates to the viability of their corporate farms, which consist of various stakeholders. As the CAP direct payments will be allocated to farm holdings, they might exacerbate the distributional conflicts among these stakeholders regarding the way profit...
Tipo: Meeting Paper Palavras-chave: THEORIE DES JEUX; PROPRIETAIRES CAP DIRECT PAYMENTS; CORPORATE FARMS; DISTRIBUTIONAL CONFLICTS; GAME THEORY; LANDOWNERS.
Ano: 2005 URL: http://www.prodinra.inra.fr/prodinra/pinra/doc.xsp?id=PROD20095f94ba5b&uri=/notices/prodinra1/2010/01/
Registros recuperados: 6
Primeira ... 1 ... Última
 

Empresa Brasileira de Pesquisa Agropecuária - Embrapa
Todos os direitos reservados, conforme Lei n° 9.610
Política de Privacidade
Área restrita

Embrapa
Parque Estação Biológica - PqEB s/n°
Brasília, DF - Brasil - CEP 70770-901
Fone: (61) 3448-4433 - Fax: (61) 3448-4890 / 3448-4891 SAC: https://www.embrapa.br/fale-conosco

Valid HTML 4.01 Transitional